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ABSTRACT 
Only a small fraction of law enforcement agencies in the 
United States obtain a warrant before tracking the cell phones of 
suspects and persons of interest.  This is due, in part, to the fact 
that courts have struggled to keep pace with a changing 
technological landscape.  Indeed, courts around the country have 
issued a disparate array of holdings on the issue of warrantless cell 
phone tracking.  This lack of judicial uniformity has led to 
confusion for both law enforcement agencies and the public alike.  
In order to protect reasonable expectations of privacy in the 
twenty-first century, Congress should pass legislation requiring 
law-enforcement agencies to obtain a warrant based upon 
probable cause before they can track a cell phone except in a 
limited set of time-sensitive situations and emergencies.   
This Issue Brief describes the technology police use to track 
cell phones, discusses the need for federal legislation, concludes 
that current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is inadequate to 
address cell phone tracking, analyzes two bills dealing with 
“geolocation information” privacy that legislators have introduced 
in Congress, and ultimately concludes that one of those bills is 
superior to the other. 
INTRODUCTION 
Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, 
crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart. 
Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons 
in the arsenal of every arbitrary government. 
—JUSTICE ROBERT H. JACKSON
1
 
Almost ninety percent of American adults own a cell phone.
2
  Such 
pervasive cell-phone use has revolutionized the way Americans conduct 
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their lives.
3
  In response to this trend, law-enforcement agencies have 
changed the ways they fight crime.
4
  In 2011, law-enforcement agencies 
sent nine popular cellular-service providers over 1.3 million requests for 
customer cellular data.
5
  Because their use is so prevalent,
6
 cell phones 
serve as convenient tools for tracking suspects and persons of interest.
7
  Due 
to the absence of comprehensive federal legislation, law-enforcement 
agencies apply a wide variety of different legal standards to determine the 
propriety of tracking cell phones.
8
  Unfortunately, most agencies do not 
obtain a warrant before they begin monitoring a suspect’s cell phone. 9  In 
fact, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) reports that of over 200 
law-enforcement agencies surveyed nationwide, only a “tiny handful” 
actually acquire a warrant before tracking.
10
  In order to protect reasonable 
expectations of privacy in the twenty-first century, Congress should pass 
legislation requiring law-enforcement agencies to obtain a warrant based 
upon probable cause before they can track a cell phone except in a limited 
set of time-sensitive situations and emergencies.   
Warrantless cell-phone tracking presents a great challenge to Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  Courts have churned out a disparate array of 
holdings on the issue.
11
  The lack of judicial uniformity has created 
confusion for law-enforcement agencies and consumers.  Consequently, 
both groups need comprehensive federal legislation to tackle the privacy 
challenges presented by warrantless cell-phone tracking.  As Justice Alito 
wrote in United States v. Jones, “[i]n circumstances involving dramatic 
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technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be 
legislative.”12  Courts are ill-equipped to keep pace with rapid changes in 
cell-phone technology and the shifting expectations of privacy that 
accompany them.  Conversely, “[a] legislative body is well situated to 
gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to balance 
privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way.”13   
First, this Issue Brief discusses the cellular location technology that 
police use to monitor citizens who use cell phones.  Specifically, this 
commentary will examine cell site, GPS, and WiFi technology.  Second, 
this Issue Brief will show that legislation is needed in this area because cell-
phone tracking is a widespread practice that may eventually replace 
federally regulated wiretapping to some degree.  Third, this Issue Brief will 
dissect United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court’s landmark GPS case, and 
explain why the decision is not helpful to lower courts confronted with cell-
phone privacy issues.  Fourth, this Issue Brief will explain how current 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is problematic when it comes to 
protecting peoples’ expectations of privacy in cellular location data.  In 
particular, this Issue Brief will address the inadequacies of the “third-party 
doctrine”—the idea that people forfeit their expectations of privacy when 
they share information with or allow their information to be seen by 
others.
14
  Finally, this Issue Brief will evaluate two bills dealing with 
“geolocation information” privacy that legislators have introduced in the 
U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate.  The article concludes 
that one bill is far more effective in protecting cellular privacy interests than 
the other. 
I. THE TECHNOLOGY 
 Police can track cell phones using a variety of methods.  One 
method is by obtaining cell-site information.
15
  Cell-site information refers 
to the location data that a cellular-service provider or even a third party can 
gather when a cell-phone user makes or receives a call.
16
  Another method 
police use is gathering data from the GPS (global positioning satellite) 
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technology embedded in “smartphones.”17  Modern smartphones equipped 
with GPS technology can be located nearly anywhere.
18
  Furthermore, many 
cell phones contain tracking chips that allow service providers to locate 
subscribers—even when the phones are not in use.19  
Traditional cell-site tracking is possible because service providers maintain 
a network of towers that send and receive signals from cell phones.
20
  Those 
companies collect and maintain records so they can identify which towers 
provided a cell phone with service at the beginning and end of every phone 
call.
21
  The recorded information also identifies the date and time of a call, 
the number of the cell phone used, and indicates whether the call was 
incoming or outgoing.
22
  Using this data, the government can determine a 
user’s general location at the time of a call.23  The actual location 
information is not precise because the government can only tell which cell-
phone tower was closest to the user.
24
  Furthermore, since the distance 
between cell-phone towers varies, so does the degree of accuracy in locating 
a user.
25
  Some companies have divided their towers’ service areas into 120-
degree sectors with each individual tower serving as a focal point.
 26
  This 
method allows companies to locate individuals with greater precision, but 
not with enough spatial specificity to determine whether someone is in a 
particular building.
27
  However, the government is still able to use 
information from multiple towers to triangulate the origin of a cell-phone 
call.
28
    
Law-enforcement agencies can obtain cell-site tracking information 
from service providers in two ways.
29
  First, agencies can ask a provider for 
“historical” cell-site data, which is information about a user’s past locations 
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collected over a particular time period.
30
  The amount of historical data 
available to police is potentially enormous, since providers keep extensive 
records of customers’ past locations.31  The U.S. Department of Justice 
reports that Verizon keeps records of its customers’ past locations for one 
year and AT&T keeps records dating back to July 2008.
32
  However, neither 
Verizon nor AT&T discloses these facts in their privacy policies.  Second, 
agencies can ask for “prospective” data, information that a company 
provides in real time.
33
  Regardless of whether the data is obtained post hoc 
or in real time, the actual information is identical.
34
   
Law-enforcement agencies can also obtain cell-site data directly by 
using portable devices called StingRays.
35
  StingRays mimic cell-phone 
towers and trick cell phones into sending them information like text 
messages and cell-site locations.
36
  They can gather information from any 
cell phone in the area.
37
  Because StingRays have the potential to collect 
information from many nearby cell phones, the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation has called the practice an “unconstitutional, all you can eat data 
buffet.”38  The U.S. Department of Justice, however,  argues that law-
enforcement agencies may use StingRay without a warrant when the 
“device is not capturing the contents of a particular dialogue call . . . .”39 
Police can also track many modern smartphones through GPS 
technology.
40
  The U.S. Department of Defense maintains the GPS system 
using twenty-four satellites that orbit the Earth.
41
  The government allows 
civilian manufacturers, including cell phone producers, to use the system.
42
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Every device that uses GPS technology is embedded with an individualized 
computer chip that can pinpoint a user’s location anywhere on Earth.43  GPS 
satellites are able to determine a smartphone’s location to within 
approximately ten meters.
44
  Disrupting the ability of GPS satellites to 
locate devices carrying this technology is against federal law.
45
  However, 
many smartphones allow users to disable the GPS tracking feature.
46
 
Some phones even have tracking chips that store a variety of information 
that can potentially offer law enforcement a comprehensive sketch of a cell-
phone user’s movements throughout the day.47  For instance, certain 
versions of Apple’s iPhone collect “geographic data” every time users turn 
on the Location Services option in their phones’ settings or when they use a 
GPS application.
48
  The device will save information about nearby cell-
phone towers and WiFi hotspots, assign the data a random identification 
number, and transmit it to Apple every twelve hours (or whenever Internet 
access next become available).
49
  Using any one of these methods, law-
enforcement agencies can determine a user’s location easily and cheaply. 
II. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION 
 Cell-phone use in the United States is ubiquitous.
50
  As of April 
2012, a total of 88 percent of American adults owned a cell phone.
51
  By 
December 2012, there were approximately 326,400,000 wireless subscriber 
connections in the country.
52
  This means that there are at least ten million 
more wireless connections than people in the U.S. today.
53
  Additionally, in 
35.8 percent of American households, cell phones have replaced traditional 
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home phones completely.
54
  Cell phones have become a principal feature of 
contemporary American life.   
With the rise of multifunctional smartphones, such as iPhones and 
BlackBerry devices, cell phones have become even more important.  They 
operate not only as telephones but also as personal digital organizers, 
cameras, email readers, music players, etc.
55
  As one technology expert put 
it, “[w]e now carry our phones with us wherever we go, and we expect them 
to have service wherever we happen to be.”56  
As Americans increasingly rely on their cell phones, police 
continually devote more attention to tracking mobile devices in order to 
monitor suspects and persons of interest.
57
  Data suggests that police are, to 
some extent, replacing traditional wiretaps with cell-phone tracking.
58
  In 
2011, the number of warrants issued for wiretaps decreased 14 percent 
while nine cell-phone service providers responded to 1.3 million police 
demands for user information.
59
  In fact, in order to handle the massive 
volume of requests, most service providers pay teams of lawyers, data 
technicians, and other professionals to review requests and provide data to 
police twenty-four hours a day.
60
   
Obtaining tracking information is less expensive and less time-
consuming for law enforcement than securing a warrant to wiretap a 
suspect’s phone.61  A shift away from wiretaps is troublesome because 
police can increasingly evade the privacy protections of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), a comprehensive statute that places 
limitations on police wiretapping as well as electronic and aural 
eavesdropping.
62
  Significantly, the interceptions prohibited by ECPA are 
those that capture a communication’s “content,” in other words, 
“information concerning [its] substance, purport, or meaning.”63  Since 
cellular location data does not include content, the statute does not regulate 
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its interception, use, or disclosure.
64
  Instead, the widespread police practice 
of obtaining cellular location information from providers is left in the hands 
of the courts.
65
  Judges, limited to deciding particular cases with particular 
facts, are simply unable to fashion broad, detailed regulatory schemes like 
ECPA.
66
  The practice should be regulated alonh the same lines as 
wiretapping in order to protect modern privacy expectations.  Any judicial 
substitute would fall short of that goal. 
III. UNITED STATES V. JONES OFFERS LITTLE GUIDANCE 
The Supreme Court opinion in United States v. Jones does not offer 
direct guidance to lower courts on the question of government cellular 
geolocation data surveillance.
67
  In Jones, Justice Scalia, writing for the 
majority, held that the government’s warrantless physical occupation of 
someone’s property qualifies as a per se “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment.
68
  In that case, the government attached a GPS tracking device 
underneath the defendant’s car and monitored his movements on public 
roadways for twenty-eight days—all without a search warrant.69  Justice 
Scalia concluded that this kind of common-law trespass would constitute a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment as it was understood at the time of the 
Amendment’s ratification and was therefore not acceptable without a 
warrant.
70
   
The holding in Jones does not repudiate the “reasonable expectation 
of privacy” test developed in Katz v. United States, but rather complements 
it.
71
  In fact, Justice Sotomayor and Justice Alito both wrote concurring 
opinions in Jones that embraced the application of the “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” test from Katz.72  In Katz, the Court held that the 
Fourth Amendment protects “people, not places” and the government’s 
placement of a listening device on the outside of a public telephone booth 
qualified as a Fourth Amendment “search.”73  The “reasonable expectation 
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of privacy” test applied in subsequent cases derives from Justice Harlan’s 
famous concurrence, in which he maintained that the Fourth Amendment 
has a “twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy, and, second, that the expectation be one 
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”74  Since Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion did not supplant this test, the government’s 
obtainment of cellular location data from a service provider would fall 
under the Katz test.
75
  Indeed, as Justice Scalia explicitly stated, 
“[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without 
trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.”76  And as Justice 
Sotomayor remarked in her concurrence, “[i]n cases of electronic or other 
novel modes of surveillance that do not depend upon a physical invasion on 
property, the majority’s . . . trespassory test may provide little guidance.”77   
While Justice Sotomayor endorsed both the majority rule and the 
Katz test,
78
 Justice Alito rejected Justice Scalia’s property-based rule.79  
Instead, Justice Alito would have held for the defendant using a strict Katz 
analysis.
80
  Without providing much explanation, he stated simply that “the 
use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses 
impinges on expectations of privacy,” and “[w]e need not identify with 
precision the point at which the tracking of this vehicle became a search, for 
the line was surely crossed before the 4-week mark.”81  Justice Scalia 
rightfully criticized this conclusion for raising two important unanswered 
questions.
82
  First, if extended GPS tracking would impinge on reasonable 
expectations of privacy only for “most offenses,” what kind of offenses 
would legitimize such an investigation?
83
 And, second, why is four weeks 
“surely” too long?84  The answers to these thorny questions should be 
determined by a legislative body that, as Justice Alito wrote, is “well 
situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to 
balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way.”85    
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IV. THE INADEQUACY OF THE CURRENT DOCTRINE 
Since Jones does not address the problem, lower courts must turn to 
general Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in order to determine the 
boundaries of society’s reasonable privacy expectations for cellular location 
data.  Unfortunately, courts face a major doctrinal obstacle in aligning 
Fourth Amendment protections with modern societal norms in the “third-
party doctrine”—the idea that when a person shares information with or 
allows her information to be seen by others, she forfeits her expectations of 
privacy in that information.
86
  While explicating this same basic principle, 
the Supreme Court has articulated three different manifestations of this 
doctrine throughout the years.
87
   
The first manifestation, referred to as the “knowing exposure” 
doctrine, was originally articulated in Katz when the Court wrote that 
“[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or 
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”88  The Court 
applied this doctrine in United States v. Knotts, when it held that a “[a] 
person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to 
another.”89  This idea was expanded in the three so-called “flyover cases,” 
where the Court held that police could observe activities on private property 
from an aircraft and not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment so long as they 
stayed in the air.
90
  
The second manifestation of the doctrine is referred to as the 
“general use” idea.91  In one of the flyover cases, the Court held that a 
Fourth Amendment “search” does not occur when the government uses 
technology to survey private property as long as the gadget is “generally 
available to the public.”92  Therefore, in Dow Chemical v. EPA, the 
government did not conduct a “search” when it used a $22,000 mapmaking 
camera mounted to an airplane to spy on private property because cameras 
are readily available to the public.
93
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The third and final manifestation of the doctrine is referred to as the 
“assumption of the risk” principle.94  The two principal cases articulating 
the assumption of the risk doctrine are Miller v. United States and Smith v. 
Maryland.
95
  In Miller, the government had obtained copies of the 
defendant’s checks and various records from two of his banks using 
allegedly defective subpoenas but nonetheless successfully submitted them 
into evidence during a criminal trial.
96
  The Court held that there was no 
Fourth Amendment violation because a person “takes the risk, in revealing 
his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person 
to the Government . . . even if the information is revealed on the assumption 
that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in 
the third party will not be betrayed.”97  The Court went so far as to say that 
even if the banks acted “solely as Government agents” in copying Miller’s 
information and “complying without protest,” their deeds did not violate 
anyone’s Fourth Amendment rights.98  Furthermore, the banks’ failure even 
to notify Miller about their cooperation with law enforcement was not 
problematic.
99
  In a footnote, the Court deemed this omission “neglect 
without legal consequences . . . however unattractive it may be.”100    
Dissenting in Miller, Justice Brennan quoted at length from 
Burrows v. Superior Court, a California Supreme Court opinion about a 
case with similar facts.
101
  In Burrows, a unanimous California Supreme 
Court concluded that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in bank documents created within the ordinary course of business.
102
  The 
court rejected the view that a depositor surrenders his Fourth Amendment 
interests in his bank records just because a “detached and disinterested” 
bank might voluntarily disclose their contents.
103
  The reason is because 
giving financial information to a bank “is not entirely volitional, since it is 
impossible to participate in the economic life of contemporary society 
without maintaining a bank account.”104  The consequences of revoking 
someone’s Fourth Amendment interests in his banking habits are 
particularly pernicious because, “[i]n the course of such dealings, a 
                                                     
94
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95
 Id. 
96
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depositor reveals many aspects of his personal affairs, opinions, habits, and 
associations.  Indeed, the totality of bank records provides a virtual current 
biography.”105  With keen foresight, the court went on to remark that the 
“[d]evelopment of photocopying machines, electronic computers and other 
sophisticated instruments have accelerated the ability of government to 
intrude into areas which a person normally chooses to exclude from prying 
eyes and inquisitive minds.”106  Therefore, courts interpreting constitutional 
protections of privacy must “keep pace with the perils created by these new 
devices.”107 
However, the California Supreme Court’s warning did not prevent 
the assumption-of-the-risk doctrine from solidifying.  Three years after 
Miller, the Supreme Court decided Smith using the same rule.
108
  In Smith, 
the police had installed a device called a pen register at a telephone 
company (with the company’s consent) to record any phone numbers the 
defendant dialed from his house.
109
  Smith was convicted of robbery after 
evidence at trial showed he had called a number which connected him to the 
crime.
110
  Smith argued for the suppression of the evidence on Fourth 
Amendment grounds,
111
 but the Court ultimately held that when a person 
“voluntarily” dials a phone number, he “assume[s] the risk that the company 
would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.”112  
Assumption of the risk was what Justice Sotomayor was referring to 
in Jones when she wrote, “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise 
that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information 
disclosed to third parties.”113  She elaborated: 
This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a 
great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the 
course of carrying out mundane tasks. People disclose the phone 
numbers that they dial or text to their cellular providers; the URLs that 
they visit and the e-mail addresses with which they correspond to their 
Internet service providers; and the books, groceries, and medications 
they purchase to online retailers. Perhaps, as Justice Alito notes, some 
people may find the “tradeoff” of privacy for convenience 
“worthwhile,” or come to accept this “diminution of privacy” as 
“inevitable,” . . . and perhaps not. I for one doubt that people would 
                                                     
105
 Id. 
106
 Id. at 451. 
107
 Id. 
108
 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 745, 744 (1979). 
109
 Id. at 737. 
110
 Id. at 737–38. 
111
 Id. at 737. 
112
 Id. at 744.  
113
 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
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accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure to the Government 
of a list of every Web site they had visited in the last week, or month, 
or year. But whatever the societal expectations, they can attain 
constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy. I 
would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some 
member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, 
disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.
114
 
The assumption-of-the-risk leg of the third-party doctrine is 
particularly relevant to a discussion about tracking.  Even if a person is 
“voluntarily” transmitting electronic information to a cellular-service 
provider, it does not necessarily follow that she is willing to have all of her 
cellular location data arbitrarily (or even non-arbitrarily) handed over to the 
police.  Viewed in the aggregate and considering how frequently people 
carry their phones with them outside their homes, cellular location data can 
paint a vivid and revealing portrait of someone’s life.  In order to keep those 
details out of government hands, cellular location data should be kept 
private.   
One scholar refers to this concept as the “mosaic theory”—“the idea 
that certain types of governmental investigation enable accumulation of so 
many individual bits about a person’s life that the resulting personality 
picture is worthy of constitutional protection.”115  Not only did Justice 
Sotomayor express support for the idea,
116
 so did Justice Alito when he 
wrote that “society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and 
others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly 
monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a 
very long period.”117  Discussing a case about the warrantless installation of 
a GPS device similar to that in Jones, the New York Court of Appeals put it 
this way: 
Disclosed in the data retrieved from the transmitting unit, nearly 
instantaneously with the press of a button on the highly portable 
receiving unit, will be trips the indisputably private nature of which 
takes little imagination to conjure: trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic 
surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, 
the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union 
meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and on. 
What the technology yields and records with breathtaking quality and 
quantity is a highly detailed profile, not simply of where we go, but by 
easy inference, of our associations—political, religious, amicable and 
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amorous, to name only a few—and of the pattern of our professional 
and avocational pursuits.
118
 
Whether the GPS data comes from a discreetly installed GPS device 
or directly from someone’s phone makes no difference.  The threat of 
governmental intrusion into the private lives of citizens is the same.  
Notably, the New York Court of Appeals decided its GPS case under the 
New York State Constitution instead of federal law because so many federal 
appellate courts had not yet weighed in on the issue.
119
  Unfortunately, 
federal judicial theory has not yet caught up with today’s technological 
landscape and society’s evolving expectations of privacy.120  And while not 
insurmountable, the third-party doctrine could very likely stymie the efforts 
of federal courts to revamp this area of law and lead to logically constrained 
opinions as judges attempt to reconcile precedent with today’s brave new 
world.  Therefore, Congress, not the courts, should take the lead on this 
issue by introducing legislation that would constrain the third-party doctrine 
and establish robust privacy protections for cellular location data. 
V. LEGISLATION 
Legislation is needed to protect the privacy of Americans leading 
twenty-first century lives.  Congressional legislators introduced two bills in 
2012 that, if passed, would have regulated the disclosure of cellular location 
information.
121
  The first did not address the problems associated with 
government tracking and therefore would not have protected citizens’ 
Fourth Amendment rights.
122
  The second, which legislators reintroduced in 
2013,
123
 does address cellular location data privacy problems and is a 
terrific improvement over the status quo,
124
 although it could be 
strengthened with additional provisions to ensure greater law-enforcement 
accountability.  
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The first bill was the “Location Privacy Protection Act of 2012,” 
sponsored by Senator Al Franken (D-MN).
125
  Unless an exception applied, 
the Location Privacy Protection Act would not have allowed certain entities, 
including service providers,
126
 to “knowingly collect, receive, record, 
obtain, or disclose to a nongovernmental individual or entity the geolocation 
information from an electronic communications device without the express 
authorization of the individual that is using the electronic communications 
device.”127 The term “electronic communications device” would have 
almost certainly included cell phones,
128
 and “geolocation information” 
would have included cell-site, GPS, and WiFi data.
129
  However, the 
legislation would not have prevented warrantless government searches of 
that information.
130
  The central provision of the Location Privacy 
Protection Act would have only regulated disclosure to nongovernmental 
individuals and entities.
131
  Furthermore, the legislation included an explicit 
exception for providers disclosing customer geolocation information in 
response to a request from any “law enforcement or intelligence agency of 
the United States, a State, or a political subdivision of a State” with no 
warrant requirement.
132
  The legislation, which would have created an 
private right of action for violations,
133
 appeared to be primarily designed as 
a consumer-protection law and not as a solution to any Fourth Amendment 
problems.
134
 
The other act under consideration by Congress, the “Geolocation 
Privacy and Surveillance Act” (GPS Act), is far superior because it directly 
addresses government searches.
135
  The original GPS Act died in committee 
in 2012,
136
 but on March 21, 2013, Representative Jason Chaffetz (R-UT) 
reintroduced it in the House, and Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) reintroduced 
a companion bill in the Senate.
137
  The principal provision of the Act echoes 
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the language of 18 U.S.C. § 2510 in ECPA, and, except as otherwise 
specified, prohibits the actual or attempted intentional interception, 
disclosure, or use of a person’s geolocation information.138  “Geolocation 
information” for purposes of the GPS Act means “any information that is 
not the content of a communication, concerning the location of a wireless 
communication device or tracking . . . device that, in whole or in part, is 
generated by or derived from the operation of that device” and can be used 
to determine the location of the device’s user.139  This broad statement 
would cover both historical and prospective cellular location data.
140
  The 
GPS Act, therefore, would provide significant privacy protection for cell-
phone users. 
Rep. Chaffetz testified at a subcommittee hearing that he introduced 
the GPS Act because “the government and law enforcement should not be 
able to track somebody indefinitely without their knowledge or consent or 
without obtaining a probable cause warrant from a judge.”141  The 
legislation, if passed, would require government entities to obtain a warrant 
upon probable cause before they could ask a provider for a customer’s 
geolocation information.
142
  Unlike ECPA, however, the GPS Act does not 
detail the exact procedural requirements that law enforcement or 
investigative officers must follow in order to obtain a warrant.
143
  Instead, 
the warrant provision in the GPS Act refers to the general Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure regarding search and seizure.
144
  While certainly an 
improvement over current state of the law, a more particularized warrant 
provision embedded within the GPS Act would offer more robust privacy 
protections.  For example, the warrant provision could adopt the rule in 
ECPA requiring officers applying for a warrant to state whether or not less 
intrusive surveillance procedures have been tried or if such a procedure 
would be impractical or too dangerous.
145
  Another protection that could be 
borrowed from ECPA is the provision stipulating that officers must make a 
“full and complete statement of the facts” regarding previous warrant 
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applications concerning the “same persons, facilities or places.”146  
Furthermore, a reporting requirement should be added so that the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts can publish statistics on 
tracking.  By including these provisions in the Act, legislators could ensure 
that law-enforcement officials are held accountable for their surveillance 
activities. 
While the bill could use improvement, overall it is well crafted and 
balanced.  Tracking the language of ECPA almost exactly, the GPS Act 
would prohibit the use of illicitly procured geolocation information as 
evidence.
147
  And like the Location Privacy Protection Act, the GPS Act 
would prohibit providers from disclosing consumer geolocation information 
generally (due to profit motivations or otherwise).
148
  However, the GPS 
Act would wisely insulate businesses that collect geolocation information in 
the normal course of business from liability.
149
  It also includes other 
common-sense exceptions for instances of consent,
150
 when the information 
is already public,
151
 the interception of information during emergency 
situations as when someone’s “life or safety . . . is threatened,”152 and when 
the owner of a device authorizes a person acting under color of law to locate 
someone who has unlawfully taken the device.
153
  Finally, just as in ECPA, 
the legislation would allow for both criminal punishment and civil remedies 
in case of a violation while also providing for certain “good faith” defenses 
to such actions.
154
 
Notably, the predecessor of the current bill enjoyed the support of 
both the ACLU and from industry.
155
  Catherine Crump, an ACLU staff 
attorney, testified at a congressional subcommittee hearing that the GPS Act 
“would allow legitimate law enforcement investigations to proceed, while 
ensuring that innocent Americans do not have their privacy intruded 
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upon.”156  Without a law requiring judicial oversight of police tracking, she 
opined, “[i]nnocent Americans can never be confident that they are free 
from round-the-clock surveillance by law enforcement of their activities.”157  
Just as important, telecommunications corporations and Internet companies 
also support a warrant requirement.
158
  Edward J. Black, president and CEO 
of the Computer & Communications Industry Association, spoke at the 
same hearing to emphasize that businesses in the technology sector want 
clarifying legislation in order to alleviate consumer concerns about the 
vulnerability of their geolocation information.
159
  On behalf of his 
organization’s member companies, which employ over half a million 
workers in the United States,
160
 Black endorsed the legislation.
161
  The GPS 
Act’s popularity with both civil libertarians and industry insiders shows that 
the legislation enjoys broad support and therefore should be enacted 
promptly.    
CONCLUSION 
Obtaining a warrant is not an overly cumbersome task and is made 
relatively simple with modern technology.
162
  In thirty-four states and the 
District of Columbia, police can apply for a warrant remotely by telephone 
or electronic means.
163
  This includes via e-mail, facsimile, or even text.
164
  
In Utah, for example, one law enforcement officer calculated that he can 
obtain an electronic warrant in about twenty minutes.
165
  With warrants so 
easy to procure today, there is little reason why Congress should not pass a 
bill mandating warrants for cell-phone tracking in non-emergency 
situations.  The simple act of engaging in a modern activities, like using cell 
phones, should not force Americans to sacrifice their constitutionally 
protected right to privacy.  Adopting a comprehensive geolocation 
information privacy statute like the GPS Act, even without the suggested 
improvements mentioned above, would go a long way towards protecting 
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what Justice Louis Brandeis called “the most comprehensive of rights and 
the right most valued by civilized men”—“the right to be let alone.”166 
                                                     
166
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